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A re-dividing nation? A newly polarised electoral geography of 
Great Britain. 
 
 
Abstract. One feature of the result of the 2015 British general election was the reduction, to a level 
lower than at any time since 1945, in the number of marginal constituencies. This paper shows that 
ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞůĂŶĚƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚĞŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
smaller parties, compared to the previous election in 2010. Although support for the two largest 
parties  ? Conservative and Labour  ? changed very little, nevertheless the 2015 result meant that 
each had fewer marginal seats to defend and more safe seats where its continued incumbency was 
virtually assured. Having demonstrated how this came about, because of two elements in a classic 
model of the spatial distribution of votes and their translation into seats, the paper explores the 
likely impacts of a reduction in the number of MPs and new rules for the redistribution of 
constituency boundaries on that situation. After the 2 ? ? ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ
the largest, let alone the majority, party in the House of Commons were slight unless it achieved a 
swing of some 6 percentage points; with the proposed new constituencies, that task would be even 
harder. 
 
Keywords: spatial polarisation; electoral geography; marginal and safe seats; redistribution 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the 1980s there was much concern about a growing electoral and political division in Great 
Britain, usually expressed in shorthand as a north-south divide (Johnston et al., 1988). Such concern 
ĚŝƐƐŝƉĂƚĞĚĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚEĞǁ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?ǁŚen  ? especially in 1997 and 2001  ? it 
won a substantial number of seats in what was previously considered relatively safe Conservative 
territory. However, >ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐůŽƐƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌŝŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶ ? ? ? ?witnessed the 
opening up of a new divide, which could have major consequences for the outcome of the next 
election. 
 
Both of those periods  ? 1983-1992 and 2010-2015  ? have been characterised by a relatively small 
number of marginal constituencies. One discussion of the number of marginals shows that they fell 
to their lowest number since 1955 in 1983 (Curtice, 2015, 28: Figure 1). There was then a recovery, 
though at its peak the number of marginal constituencies in 1997 and 2001 was less than at any 
election prior to 1974. After a further decline only 85 constituencies (out of 632 in Great Britain) 
qualified as marginal at the 2010 election. The number declined again to 74 in 2015  ? the smallest 
over the sixteen elections studied, and less than half that recorded in the five contests during the 
period 1955-1970. 
 
ƵƌƚŝĐĞ ?ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƐĞĂƚƐ ?those where the Conservative share of the (Conservative plus 
Labour) vote total would be between 45-55 per cent if there were a uniform shift across British 
constituencies so that the two parties had equal shares of the national vote total  ? presents a valid 
picture of the situation when those parties predominated but is less relevant to the situation at later 
elections when other parties were challenging for, and occasionally winning, seats. But his argument 
regarding the declining number of marginal constituencies still holds for the more recent contests 
when such additional contests are included. After the 2010 election, for example, as well as 120 
constituencies where the Conservatives and Labour occupied first and second places with majorities 
over the other of less than ten percentage points there were also 40 where the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats shared first and second places separated by a margin of less than 10 percentage 
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points; another 27 had the same margin between Labour and Liberal Democrat candidates 
occupying the first two places (Johnston and Pattie, 2011). Additionally there were three seats in 
Scotland where the SNP occupied one of the first two places with a margin of victory less than ten 
points; a further three in Wales where Plaid Cymru came either first or second; and the Green 
ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐDWǁŽŶƌŝŐŚƚŽŶWĂǀŝůŝŽŶďǇ ?.4 points. This gave an overall total of 194 seats where the gap 
between the winner and the second-placed party was less than 10 percentage points. After the 2015 
election, that total had fallen to 126, a reduction of over one-third: 85 had the Conservatives and 
Labour in the first two places; 13, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats; 5, Labour and Liberal 
Democrats; one each involving the Conservatives and Labour with a UKIP candidate in second place, 
ƉůƵƐůĂĐƚŽŶǁŚĞƌĞh</W ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚate defeated the Conservative; there were nine in Scotland 
involving the SNP and two in Wales involving Plaid Cymru.  
 
A corollary of fewer marginal constituencies has been a growth in the number of very safe seats, 
defined here as those won by a margin of 20 percentage points or more. There were 274 after the 
2010 election  ? 145 won by the Conservatives, 115 by Labour, 12 by the Liberal Democrats, one by 
Plaid Cymru, and one by the Speaker.
1
 Five years later that number had increased by almost 100, to 
372: 209 of them were won by the Conservatives, 134 by Labour and 28 by the SNP  ? plus that held 
by the Speaker.  
 
dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƚŚƵƐƐĞǀĞƌĂůŵĂũŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ
2015. At the first election in that pair, for example, 31 per cent of all constituencies in Great Britain 
ǁĞƌĞŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǁŝŶŶŝŶŐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĞǆĐĞĞĚĞĚƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƉůĂĐĞd 
candidate by less than 10 percentage points); 43 per cent were won by a margin of more than 20 
points and therefore were unlikely to be lost at the next contest unless there was a very major shift 
ŝŶǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĂďůĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞƐof marginal and safe seats 
were 20 and 59 respectively. The number of marginal seats had declined by just over one-third while 
the number of very safe seats had increased by almost exactly the same rate. This is a very 
substantial change: accounting for it is the purpose of the remainder of this paper, by exploring the 
other major changes between those two elections  ? the rapid growth in support for the SNP, UKIP 
and the Green party, and the substantial decline in voting for the Liberal Democrats. That 
explanation is set in the framework of a classic work on the spatial patterning of votes, illustrating 
how particular situations can be viewed as exemplars of general models. 
 
Electoral Geographical Foundations 
 
In their classic study of Seats, Votes, and the Spatial Organisation of Elections, Gudgin and Taylor 
(1979) showed that the translation of votes into seats in first-past-the-post electoral systems is a 
function of three factors: the degree of spatial concentration of the supporters of each political 
ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐǁŚĞƌĞĂƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĂƌĞĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚĂƌĞĐůƵƐƚĞƌĞĚ
together; and the configuration of the constituency map superimposed on those two geographies. 
They showed that the number of seats won by a party is a function not only of its vote share but also 
how those votes are distributed across the relevant territory. Thus, for example, a party which wins 
nearly 13 per cent of the votes cast but with them fairly evenly spread may win very few seats 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?h</W ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ
but all of them concentrated in one part of the territory only may win many more (the SNP at that 
election). As Johnston et al. (2012) have shown, it was rare at elections prior to 2015 for parties with 
less than 30 per cent of the votes cast in a constituency to win that seat, whereas with more than 45 
per cent they were almost certain to. Between 40 and 45 per cent, however, whereas Labour tended 
to win all such seats, the Conservatives only won about three-quarters and the Liberal Democrats 
less than half. Those differences reflect the operation of the geographical factors identified by 
Gudgin and Taylor. 
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Between the 1945 and 1970 general elections, inclusive, British politics were dominated by two 
parties that between them won most of the votes and even more of the seats. However, the 
Conservatives tended to gain more seats relative to their vote share compared to Labour because of 
differences in the geography of their vote-winning. Labour tended to pile up more surplus votes in 
each seat won than did the Conservatives because it amassed very large majorities in mining and 
industrial areas.
2
 /ŶƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ'ƵĚŐŝŶ ?dĂǇůŽƌŵŽĚĞůƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐǁŚĞƌĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞ
concentrated (the first of their components) were spatially more clustered (the second of the 
components) than were those areas where partisan preferences favoured the Conservatives. As a 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƐǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƚĚĞůŝǀĞƌŝŶŐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ
of Commons (on which see Johnston et al., 2001; Curtice, 2009, 2010; Curtice et al, 2010, 2015). 
Against this pro-Conservative operation of the electoral system, however, there were other aspects 
of the geography of voting that favoured Labour. It tended to get a larger share of the seats than of 
the votes because of variations in both constituency size and number of abstentions; on average 
Labour-held seats were smaller (in the number of electors) and had lower turnouts, so that fewer 
votes were need to win them than in the larger, higher-turnout Conservative-held seats. Which party 
benefited overall reflected the relative importance of these three components  ? electorate size, 
abstentions, and efficiency of the vote distribution  ? at each election (Johnston et al., 2001). 
 
The 1974 general elections introduced a major change, with the share of the vote total going to 
Labour and the Conservatives falling, though much more so than their share of the seats. This was 
because of the relative success of the Liberals, Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National Party (SNP). 
The first of these in particular suffered from the geographical problem faced by many small parties 
in first-past-the-post (fptp) electoral systems; its 1974 vote shares (19.3 per cent at the February 
election and 18.3 per cent in October) were fairly evenly distributed across the constituencies 
contested, delivering only 14 seats at the first contest and 13 at the second (out of 629). Over the 
subsequent decades it (and successor parties, now the Liberal Democrats) focused its campaigning 
geographically to get increased vote shares in particular areas where there were clusters of support. 
It increased its share of the seats accordingly, though it was still substantially under-represented; in 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚŽŶůǇ ? ?ƐĞĂƚƐ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨ'ƌĞĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?s total). Geography 
continued to militate against it, but alongside its successes it also built strong foundations across 
substantial tracts of the country where its candidates occupied second place. 
 
For Plaid Cymru and the SNP their restriction to contesting seats in particular parts of Great Britain 
only, and within each of those parts to concentrating on certain districts (north and west Wales for 
Plaid Cymru, for example), meant that for them the disadvantages experienced by the Liberals were 
less pronounced. In 2010, Plaid Cymru won 0.6 per cent of votes cast in Great Britain and three (0.5 
per cent) of the seats. The SNP were less favourably treated, largely because their concentrations of 
support were not as tightly clustered spatially as Plaid Cymru ?Ɛ ?ǁŝƚŚ ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐthe 
SNP got six (0.9 per cent) of the MPs elected. But five years later, the SNP gained 4.7 per cent of 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƚƐ ?ŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂ ĚŝƚǁŽŶĞǆĂĐƚůǇŚĂůĨŽĨĂůůŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞƐ
cast and benefited from those being fairly evenly distributed across the country. 
 
These emerging post-1970 spatial distributions of party support created a new geography of party 
competition. Up until then almost every seat had the Conservative and Labour candidates occupying 
first and second places at each election. The growth of support for the Liberal Democrats changed 
that. It is an established feature of fptp electoral systems  ? ƵǀĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛ>Ăǁ ?that multi-party 
contests are rare and the emergence of a third party in some places is usually at the cost of the 
weaker of the established larger two (Grofman et al., 2009). In Great Britain this initially involved the 
Liberal Democrats displacing Labour as the second party across considerable parts of southern 
England; not only were Labour candidates relegated to third place there but they tended to occupy 
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poor third-places (Johnston and Pattie, 2011), and the constituencies became predominantly 
Conservative->ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚĐŽŶƚĞƐƚƐ ?ĂƐƵǀĞƌŐĞƌ ?Ɛ>ĂǁǁŽƵůĚƉƌĞĚŝĐƚ ? ?/Ŷthe first part of the 
twenty-first century Liberal Democrats also became the main challenger in some Labour seats, 
especially those with large student populations, with the Conservative candidates pushed into poor 
third places. 
 
To some commentators, by 2010 English politics approximated a three- rather than a two-party 
system,
3
 but although that applied to the national distribution of votes and seats it was not the case 
across the constituencies. Instead, the country was characterised, as Table 1 shows, by four two-
party systems. Seats with Labour and the Conservatives occupying the first two places and Liberal 
Democrats a poor third formed the modal category, but there were substantial numbers where one 
of those parties shared the first two places with the Liberal Democrats. There were also 30 seats 
where Labour and the SNP occupied the first two places, and just sixteen others (out of 632) with a 
different combination. 
 
This geography of four constituency contest types, superimposed upon the individual parƚŝĞƐ ?
support geographies, provided the matrix within which a major shift occurred in 2015  ? leading to 
the reduction in the number of marginal and growth of very safe seats discussed above. 
Understanding why is the focus of the next section. 
 
More Secure Heartlands, Fewer Contested Territories 
 
Compared to the 2010 election, the result in 2015 had two major components. At its core was the 
contest between the two largest parties, where very little changed. As Table 2 shows, their vote 
totals altered only slightly, and this lack of significant change was replicated locally, with few seats 
changing allegiance: the Conservatives lost ten seats to, and gained eight from, Labour.  
 
The second component involved the smaller-ƉĂƌƚǇ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐǀĞƌǇsubstantial 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?dŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚďǇŶĞĂƌůǇƚǁŽ-ƚŚŝƌĚƐ ?h</W ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞĂůŵŽƐƚ
ƋƵĂĚƌƵƉůĞĚ ?ĂƐĚŝĚƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƚŽƚĂůŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐůĞƐƐ
than double its 2010 performance, in Scotland its share increased by two-thirds, giving it half of the 
total number of votes cast there. Seat numbers reflected the interaction between these changes and 
the support geographies they produced. The SNP, with a fairly even distribution across Scotland, 
won all but three of the 59 seats there. The Liberal Democrats returned to the typical position of a 
small party with few major clusters of substantial support (i.e. 40 per cent or more), and retained 
only 8 of the 57 constituencies won in 2010 (Thrasher et al., 2016); 27 were lost to the 
Conservatives, 12 to Labour and 10 to the SNP. That same geographical effect meant that both UKIP 
and the Greens won only a single seat each; their advance in the polls was too regular across most of 
the country  ? although neither performed well in Scotland  ? for them to be rewarded by seats in the 
House of Commons. 
 
But why were these changes also associated with the reduction in the number of marginal seats and 
the expansion of safe ones? The geographies of the collapse of the Liberal Democrat vote and the 
rise of support for UKIP and the SNP are key to answering that question. 
 
In Scotland, the situation was straightforward. Not only did the SNP win 50 per cent of the votes 
nationally, it won over 50 per cent in 35 of the 59 constituencies and less than 40 per cent in only 
five (including the three that it failed to win). Further, its majority exceeded 20 percentage points in 
28 of the seats and less than 5 points in only six. The SNP predominated across the country. 
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Elsewhere, it ǁĂƐƚŚĞĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚǀŽƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨh</W ?ƐŐƌŽǁƚŚƚŽ
match that decline which eliminated many marginal seats and created more safe ones. This is 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ǀŽƚĞůŽƐƐĞƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƚĂŬĞŶƵƉďǇũƵƐƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŽther parties; 
instead several parties attracted former Liberal Democrat supporters. As a consequence, in most 
constituencies where the Liberal Democrats had performed well in 2010 the other large party  ? 
either Conservative or Labour  ? won by an increased majority in 2015, even if its own vote share 
ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ, as illustrated in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3 concerns the seats where the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats occupied the first two 
places at the 2010 contest. The left-hand pair of columns refers to the 167 seats won by the 
Conservatives, who averaged 50.9 per cent of the votes there in 2010 and three points more in 
 ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŝƌŵĞĂŶŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŝŶ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞƉŽŝŶƚƐ ?dŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ƐŚĂƌĞĨĞůůďǇ
 ? ? ? ?ƉŽŝŶƚƐĂŶĚh</W ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŝŶĐƌĞased by 10.3 (in most cases from a low base), but the mean 
Conservative majority over the second-placed party widened by over half to 37.5 points. For 
example, in the three most marginal seats in that group in 2010, the Conservative majorities over 
the Liberal Democrats were 0.2 percentage points (Camborne & Redruth), 0.3 points (Oxford West & 
Abingdon), and 0.9 points (Truro & Falmouth): in 2015 the majorities in those three were 15.2, 16.8 
and 27.2 points respectively. (Labour came second in Camborne & Redruth in 2015.)  
 
A very similar pattern occurred in the 27 seats won by the Liberal Democrats from second-placed 
Conservative candidates in 2010 (the right-hand columns in Table 3). The mean Liberal Democrat 
vote share dropped by 17.8 points in 2015, whereas all of the other parties had a small increase. As a 
result an average Liberal Democrat majority of 9.4 points at the first contest became an average 
Conservative majority of 12.4 points five years later.  
 
Table 4 shows an even greater change in the seats where Labour came first in 2010 with the Liberal 
Democrats second: an average Labour majority of 21.3 points then was enlarged to 26.6 points in 
2015. The Liberal Democrats retained second place in none of those 73 seats: the Conservatives 
replaced them in 46, UKIP in 23, the Greens in three and the SNP in the other. 
 
The collapse of the Liberal Democrat vote in the seats it contested with the Conservatives and 
Labour in 2010 was responsible for the creation of many larger majorities there five years later, 
therefore. Because none of the other parties replaced it as a strong contender to the incumbent 
party, the latter gained more safe seats as a consequence. But what happened in the seats where 
the Conservatives and Labour occupied first and second places in 2010, where there was also a 
reduction in the number of marginal seats in 2015? Figure 2 shows the change in the Conservative 
vote share in each of the Conservative-Labour marginals held by the Conservatives (arranged in 
degree of marginality from left  ? the most marginal  ? to right). In all but three, the Conservative 
share increased, by more than 8 points. But the majority of marginal seats won by Labour in 2010 
had an increase in the Labour vote share (Figure 3); it declined in just nine of the 59.  
 
These shifts suggest that in general support for the two parties diverged in those marginal seats; 
each became relatively stronger in those it was defending. Of course in some of the Conservative-
held marginals although the Conservative vote share increased the Labour share may have increased 
even more, making the seat more marginal, and perhaps delivering a Labour victory. But that was 
rare. Figure 4 shows the change for each of the two parties in the 2010 Conservative-held marginals. 
Those to the left of the diagonal had a greater increase in the Labour than the Conservative vote 
share between 2010 and 2015  ? and they were very much in the minority (with only nine 
transferring their allegiance to Labour). In most of those marginals, the gap between the 
Conservatives and Labour widened. In the Labour-held marginals, on the other hand (Figure 5), in 
ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚďǇŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞ
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constituencies to the right of the diagonal), with eight of those where the opposite was the case 
being Conservative gains. In seats won by Labour in 2010 and retained in 2015, the mean majority 
over the Conservatives was 6.1 percentage points in 2010 and 10.2 points in 2015, whilst in those 
marginals won by the Conservatives and then held again in 2015 the comparable means were 4.0 
and 9.2. On average the gap between the two parties widened substantially in the marginal seats  ? 
in most cases favouring the 2010 winner there. 
  
Why was there a widening divide between the two parties in their marginal seats? Curtice et al. 
(2015, 418) argue that a personal vote against the general trend for incumbent candidates elected in 
2010 for the first time helped several Conservative candidates win again in marginal constituencies, 
whereas several of those gained by Labour were seats with relatively large ethnic minority 
populations. In Conservative-held marginals, the mean change in the Conservative vote share 
between 2010 and 2015 in seats fought by first-time incumbents was an increase of 4.6 percentage 
points whereas in those fought by MPs elected prior to 2010 it was 3.5 points; there was a wider 
difference in ƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞŝŶLabour-held marginals, a mean increase of 5.9 
points in those defended by first-time incumbents and of 3.0 in those whose Labour MP was first 
elected before 2010.   
 
Across all of the Conservative-Labour marginal constituencies, however, a further significant cause 
of the widening gap between the two parties was the collapse in the Liberal Democrat share of the 
vote there: ƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ůŽƐƚǀŽƚĞƐ ?were differently distributed across other parties depending on whether 
the Conservatives or Labour won the seat in 2010. Table 5 shows the votes by supporters at the 
2015 election according to which of the three largest parties they voted for in those seats in 2010, 
derived from the 2015 weighted British Election Study panel survey. (That survey under-represented 
the number of abstainers, but that is unlikely to have significantly affected the balance in the flows 
across the parties.) Thus in the Conservative-held Conservative-Labour marginal seats (the top panel 
in Table 5) the Liberal Democrats retained only 12 per cent of their support, with 36 per cent going 
to Labour and 28 per cent to the Conservatives, a ratio of 1.29 between Labour and Conservative. In 
the Labour-held marginals (the lower panel) not only did the Liberal Democrats retain a larger share 
of their 2010 support, but many more of those who switched their allegiance moved to Labour 
rather than to the Conservatives (a ratio of 2.80).
4
 These differences enabled Labour to extend its 
lead over the Conservatives in Labour-held marginal seats, with the relatively small shifts from the 
Liberal Democrats (or from the Conservatives and Labour) to UKIP and the Greens not ameliorating 
those movements.
5
 Although local situations influenced the changes in some seats, such as the 
better-than-average performance of incumbent MPs defending their constituencies for the first time 
that many marginal seats, both Conservative- and Labour-held, became safer for their incumbent 
party in 2015 reflected the differential waning of Liberal Democrat support there. Indeed, the 
relative success of first-time incumbent MPs may well have at least in part been a consequence of 
them being better able than other candidates to attract votes from former Liberal Democrat 
supporters. 
 
The results of these various processes are shown in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 indicates the situation for 
each of the seven parties that won seats in 2015. For three of them  ? Labour, Conservative and SNP 
 ? it illustrates the extent of their secure heartlands, with substantial numbers of safe and very safe 
seats each and relatively few that are marginal. For the other four, it shows that apart from the seats 
that they won in 2015, many of them by small margins only, there were very few seats that they lost 
then but by relatively small margins suggesting that they might be winnable at the next election. 
Table 7 focuses on the changed situation facing the Labour and Conservative parties between the 
2010 and 2015 general elections; a much reduced number of marginal seats won and lost and many 
more that were either safe (won by margins of 20 percentage points or more) or hopeless (lost by 
the same extent) in 2015 than 2010. 
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Conclusions 
 
The geography of the distribution of votes for each of the political parties, and that of abstentions, is 
a crucial influence on how many seats each party wins, as is the geography of constituency 
boundaries laid across those distributions. At any given share of the votes certain geographies  ? 
their degrees of concentration and clustering of support  ? are more favourable towards some 
parties than others in the translation of votes into seats. Those general patterns are well-
established, so when one of more of the geographies changes so too, as Gudgin and Taylor clearly 
demonstrated, should the outcome of the translation process. That is currently the case in Great 
Britain: the 2015 general election saw major changes in the vote shares won by all but one of the 
smaller parties  ? the Liberal Democrats, the Greens, UKIP, and the SNP, but not Plaid Cymru. Those 
changes influenced not only how many seats each won but also, indirectly, the prospects of the two 
largest parties  ? Conservatives and Labour  ? at the next election, even though their own vote shares 
and distributions (outside Scotland) altered very little.  
 
In Scotland the change involved the SNP increasing its vote share to 50 per cent of the total not only 
overall but also in most of the seats, with the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
suffering substantial losses. Not only did the SNP win almost all of the seats, most were won with 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůŵĂũŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞŽǀĞƌƚƵƌŶĞĚďǇĂŵĂũŽƌƐŚŝĨƚŝŶǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?/ŶŶŐůĂŶĚ
and Wales, the fall in the Liberal Democrat share of the vote and the increases in support for UKIP 
and the Greens meant that each of those three parties had a relatively even distribution of support 
across the country, as was the case for the SNP. But whereas the SNP had a large plurality of the 
votes in most places, the three smaller parties in England and Wales experienced the disadvantage 
of an even distribution when their overall share was small: they not only won few seats in those 
places where concentrations of their supporters were clustered but also failed to gain enough votes 
to make them strong challengers at the next election. As a result, the Conservatives and Labour won 
relatively more safe seats where they will be difficult to remove and most of their marginal seats 
became safer as a result of the Liberal Democrat collapse  ? which favoured each of the other two 
parties in its own marginals. 
 
Those changes in the first two geographical components ŽĨ'ƵĚŐŝŶĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ?ƐŵŽĚĞů ?the 
ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐůƵƐƚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?interact with change in the third component 
with the proposals for fewer constituencies defined using new rules for redistribution that 
emphasise electorate equality. Major change in the composition of the House of Commons at the 
next general election is as a consequence unlikely unless there is a substantial shift in support overall 
for several of the parties. As it stands, the situation after the 2015 election make a Labour victory at 
the next contest unlikely; an increase in support for the Conservatives relative to Labour could see it 
achieve a clear majority based on winning many of the Labour-held marginals shown in Table 7. The 
electorally-divided nation of the 1980s reflected polarised geographies of support for the two main 
parties then. A new electorally-divided nation from 2015 on reflects polarised support for three 
parties  ? the Conservatives, LaďŽƵƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ^EW ?'ĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐ ?ŝƐŽƐƐŝĨǇŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
electoral map, which can only be changed if there are major shifts in support for all of the political 
parties. 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 dŚĞ^ƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƐĞĂƚŝƐďǇĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?>ĂďŽƵƌĂŶĚ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ ?ŚĞ
won in Buckingham by more than 20 points in both 2010 and 2015. 
2
 Rodden (2010; Chen and Rodden, 2013) has shown that this situation affects left-leaning parties in a number 
ŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ PƚŚĞŝƌǀŽƚĞƐĂƌĞƐƉĂƚŝĂůůǇŵŽƌĞĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚĂŶĚĐůƵƐƚĞƌĞĚƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝƌŵĂŝŶŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐ ? ? 
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3
 See, for example, J. Blumenau and S. Hix,  ‘ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǀŽůǀŝŶŐŵƵůƚŝ-party systems ?, LSE British Politics and 
Policy Blog, 31 March 2015, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/britains-evolving-multi-party-systems/ 
(accessed 1 December 2016). 
4
 A chi-square test on the raw data showed a statistically significant difference (p<0.001) between the two 
distributions: Liberal Democrat voters in 2010 were more likely to switch their support to Labour if they lived 
in a Labour-held marginal constituency than if they lived in one that was Conservative-held. 
5
 Curtice et al. (2015, 418) also show that several of the seats that Labour won from the Conservatives in 2015 
had large Black and Minority Ethnic populations: in four the mean percentage White was 94 per cent; in the 
other six it was 64 per cent. 
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Table 1: The distribution of contest types at the 2010 and 2015 general elections in Great Britain. 
 
Parties Occupying First/Second Places 2010 2015  
Conservative-Labour 287 376 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat 204 50 
Labour-Liberal Democrat 95 11 
Labour-SNP 30 42 
Conservative-UKIP 0 76 
Labour-UKIP 0 44  
Other 15 32 
TOTAL* 631 631 
 
* All totals exclude the seat held by the Speaker 
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Table 2: The percentage share of the votes won by the main political parties at the 2010 and 2015 
general elections in Great Britain. 
 
 2010 2015 
Conservative 36.9 37.7 
Labour 29.7 31.1 
Liberal Democrat 23.6 8.1 
Green 1.0 3.8 
UKIP 3.2 12.9 
SNP 1.7 4.9 
PC 0.6 0.6 
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Table 3: Changes in the mean vote shares won by the parties in different constituency types where 
the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats were the leading parties at the 2010 and 2015 general 
elections 
 
 Mean Vote Share  Mean Vote Share 
 2010 2015 2010 2015 
Seats won by the Conservatives in both 2010 and 2015, Seats won by the Liberal Democrats 
with Liberal Democrats second in 2010  in 2010 with Conservatives second 
Conservative 50.9 53.9 38.5 42.6 
Liberal Democrat 27.9 16.4 47.9 30.2 
Labour 13.4 9.7 7.7 10.8 
UKIP 4.2 14.5 3.4 11.1 
Green 1.0 4.6 0.7 4.4 
Mean Majority  
Conservative 23.2 35.1  12.5 
Liberal Democrat   9.4 
Number of Constituencies 167  27 
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Table 4: Changes in the mean vote shares won by the parties in different constituency types where 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats were the leading parties at the 2010 and 2015 general elections 
 
 Mean Vote Share  Mean Vote Share 
 2010 2015 2010 2015 
Seats won by Labour in both 2010 and 2015, with Seats won by Liberal Democrats in 
Liberal Democrats second in 2010 2010 with Labour second 
Labour 47.3 53.6 32.6 45.0 
Liberal Democrat 26.0 6.3 41.5 23.7 
Conservative 16.4 17.0 17.8 14.5 
UKIP 2.3 11.9 2.5 8.8 
Green 1.3 5.6 1.5 7.0 
Mean Majority 
Labour 21.2 35.2  18.5  
Liberal Democrat   8.9 
Number of Constituencies 73  11 
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Table 5: ŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?A?ŽĨ
row totals) in Conservative-Labour marginal constituencies according to the 2010 result* 
 
   2015 Vote (%) 
2010 Vote Conservative Labour LibDem UKIP Green 
Seats won by the Conservatives in 2010 
Conservative 83 6 2 8 1 
Labour 8 83 1 5 1 
Liberal Democrat 28 36 12 14 7 
Seats won by Labour in 2010 
Conservative 77 8 1 12 1 
Labour  7 84 3 4 1 
Liberal Democrat 15 42 21 8 12 
 
* Marginal constituencies are those won by the named party with a majority of less than 10 
percentage points. 
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Table 6: The distribution of seats according to their margin of victory/defeat for each party at the 
2015 general election  
 
                                    Labour      Cons.     LibDem     UKIP       Green         Plaid          SNP 
Hopeless 284 200 581 605 629 34 0 
Little Chance 67 54 26 22 0 1 0 
Marginal Lost 48 47 16 3 1 2 3 
Marginal Won 48 56 7 1 0 0 6  
Safe 49 65 1 0 1 3 22 
Very Safe 135 209 0 0 0 0 28 
TOTAL* 631 631 631 631 631 40 59 
Per cent marginal** 15.2 16.3 3.6 0.6 0.2 5.0 15.3 
 
Key to seat types: Hopeless  ? lost by 20 percentage points or more; Little Chance  ? lost by 10-19 
percentage points; Marginal Lost  ? lost by 0-9 percentage points; Marginal Won  ? won by 0-9 points; 
Safe  ? won by 10-19 percentage points; Very Safe  ? won by 20 percentage points or more. 
 
* All totals exclude the seat held by the Speaker 
** Marginal seats are those won or lost by a margin of less than 10 points 
 
  
16 
 
 
Table 7: The distribution of margins of defeat/victory for the Labour and Conservative parties at the 
2010 and 2015 general elections (marginal constituencies are shown in bold). 
 
 
 Labour Conservative  
Margin of Loss/Win 2010 2015 2010 2015 
-20<    247 284 168 200 
-15 : -20 16 31 31 28 
-10 : -15 35 36 42 26 
  -5 : -10 33 27 55 26 
   0 :     -5 42 21 30 21 
   0 :  5 31 20 41 26  
   5 :  10 48 28 40 30 
 10 :  15 35 26 48 39  
 15 :  20 29 23 28 26  
 20<    115 135 148 209 
N*    631 631 631 631 
Per cent marginal** 24.4 15.2 14.2 26.3 16.3 16.3 
 
* All totals exclude the seat held by the Speaker 
** Marginal seats are those won or lost by a margin of less than 10 points 
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Figure 1: The number of marginal seats in Great Britain, 1955-2015 (after Curtice, 2015). 
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Figure 2: Change in the Conservative vote share 2010-2015 in Conservative-held marginal seats. 
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Figure 3: Change in the Labour vote share 2010-2015 in Labour-held marginal seats. 
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Figure 4: Change in Conservative and Labour vote shares, 2010-2015, in Conservative-held marginal 
seats. 
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Figure 5: Change in Labour and Conservative vote shares, 2010-2015, in Labour-held marginal seats. 
 
 
